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1. Under the United States Act of 1841, no title passes on a sale and conveyance of
a bankrupt's land by his assignee, unless it has been made in pursuance of an
express order of court to that effect, whether general or special; and it seem8
that the recitals in the assignee's deed will not be sufficient evidence of such an
order.
2. So where the land is held adversely at the time of the decree in bankruptcy, a
sale by the assignee more than two years after that date, will pass no title by
force of the limitation in the eighth section of the Act.-SToNG, J.
3. Where, pending a bill to foreclose a mortgage, the mortgagee becomes a bankrupt, it is not necessary to make his assignee a party to the suit; and a valid
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises may be made, though the latter
be not substituted.-STRWOXG, J.

The facts in the case sufficiently appear from the decision of the
Special term, which was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The plaintiff in this action seeks to redeem a large
number of lots in Williamsburgh from a mortgage upon them, and
other lands, made by John S. McKibbin and Thomas Nichols to
Abraham, Henry and William Boerum. The mortgage was dated
and executed on the 30th of March, 1836, and given to secure the
payment of $39,000, with interest, on or before the 1st day of
April, 1841, and was recorded on the second day after its date.On the same day McKibbin and Nichols conveyed the one-fourth
part of the mortgaged premises to George D. Strong, and on the
18th of December, 1837, Nichols conveyed his remaining estate in
such premises to his co-tenant, McKibbin, for the consideration of
one dollar. Previously to February, 1842, the mortgage debt had
been reduced to $32,000, and some portions of the land had been
released from the lien of the mortgage. In that month the
mortgagees instituted a suit in the then Court of Chancery against
MeKibbin, Strong and others, to foreclose the mortgage, and a
notice in the usual form of filing their bill, and of the pendency of
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the suit, was duly filed on the 7th of March, 1842. MicKibbin and
Strong were upon their respective petitions declared and decreed
to be bankrupts under the Act of Congress of the 19th of August,
1841, the former on the 16th of June, and the latter on the 28th
of July, 1842, and William C. H. Waddell thereupon became their
assignee, pursuant to his general appointment by'the District
Court. The foreclosure suit was then pending, and the plaintiffs
therein proceeded without making such assignee a party. A decree
of foreclosure and sale was entered (according to the complaint), on
the 22d November, 1842, but in reality subsequent to that date.
Pursuant to that decree, such parts of the mortgaged premises as
had not been released, were sold in several parcels to various
purchasers on the 7th of January, 1843, for the aggregate sum of
nineteen thousand three hundred and fifty-one dollars and twelve
cents. Deeds to the purchasers were subsequently executed, under
which the defendants in this action, some directly, but most of them
by subsequent conveyances, now hold their respective lots. Waddel],
the assignee, conveyed to the plaintiff, McKibbin's interest in the
mortgaged premises by a deed bearing date the 24th of November,
1845, for fifty cents, and Strong's interest in said premises, by two
deeds, dated respectively on the 5th and 18th of March, 1846,
each for the consideration of one dollar. In February, 1846, the
plaintiff tendered to Abraham and Henry Boerum the amount of
the unpaid principal and interest of the mortgage, with such taxes
and assessments on the mortgaged premises as they had paid, which
tender was refused by them. The plaintiff now asks and demands
that it may be ordered and adjudged that he is entitled to and may
redeem the said premises from the said mortgage; that an account
may be taken of what is now due, the interest to be calculated up
to the time of his tender, and no longer; and upon the payment of
what may be found to be due within a period to be prescribed by
the court-the defendants may be decreed to surrender to the
plaintiff possession of the premises held by them, with their title
deeds, and to re-convey and re-assign such premises to him, free
from all charges and encumbrances.
It is quite apparent from the facts which I have stated, that if
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the plaintiff has acquired any interest in the premises in dispute, it
is as prowling assignee. Waddell, the assignee in bankruptcy,
although apprised by the inventory annexed to McKibbin's petition
that he and his co-tenant were entitled to the equity of redemption
in the mortgaged premises and that proceedings to foreclose the
mortgage had been instituted, made no effort to be substituted as a
party. Although the act gave him the right, and if the interest of
creditors required it, made it his duty to do so, without any attempt
to interfere he suffered the foreclosure suit to proceed to judgment
sales to be made to innocent purchasers; the lands to be held and
improved by them or their vendees for upwards of two years, and
then conveyed a supposed right (for the benefit of creditors) for
the sum of two dollars and fifty cents-a sum which was probably
insufficient to pay the expenses of the transaction. These circumstances must have been known to the plaintiff, and he must have
supposed, too, that he could not enforce his claims, if at all, without
expensive litigation and to the prejudice of those who had acted
in good faith, and doubtless with ordinary caution. Still a prowling
assignee, and especially one who has purchased under an official sale,
may have a right to redeem, (Anon. 8 Atk. R., 313,) and if "the
law allows it," the court must "' award it."
The plaintiff contends that the decree in the foreclosure suit did
not bar the equity of redemption, as the right of the owners, who
were two of the original defendants, had during its progress become
vested in their assignee in bankruptcy, who had not been made a
party. This is his main position; and if he fails in establishing
that, he must fail altogether. There can be no doubt as to the existence or soundness of the rule, that in an equitable action in rem,
relative to real estate, the interest of a purchaser from one of the
defendants during the pendency of the suit, is barred by the decree,
although such purchaser may not have been made a party. Lord
Bacon, in the fourth volume of his works, (p. 515,) says, that "no
decree bindeth any that cometh in bona fide by conveyance from
the defendant before the bill exhibited, and is made no party
neither by bill or order; but when he comes in pendente lite, and
while the suit is in full prosecution, and without any order of al-
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lowance or privity by the court, then regularly the decree bindeth."
In the case of the Bishop of Winchester vs. Paine, (11 Ves. R.,
194,) Sir William Grant says, that "he who purchases during the
pendency of the suit is bound by the decree that may be made
against the person from whom he derives title-the litigating
parties are exempted from the necessity of taking any notice of a
title so acquired ; as to them, it is as if no such title existed, otherwise suits would be interminable; or, which -would be the same in
effect, it would be in the pleasure of one party at what period the
suit should be determined. The rule may sometimes operate with
hardship, but general convenience requires it." These remarks
were cited with approbation, and the principle was fully recognized
by Chancellor Kent, in Murray vs. Ballou. (1st Johns. Oh. R.,
578-9, 580.) The rule is generally laid down without any exception or modification. Its terms are sufficiently broad to include the
assignees of a bankrupt or insolvent debtor, who are technically
purchasers of the real estate. Chancellor Walworth seems to think
that such assignees are exempt from the rule. The reason given
by him in Sedgwick vs. Cleveland, (7 Paige, 291,) is, that the
assignee upon whom the interest of the defendant has been cast by
operation of law for the benefit of others, has a right to be heard
for the protection of that interest. So indeed he has, and it would
be erroneous to refuse him the exercise of it if he should claim it.
But where would be the injury, if it should be left to his option to
claim it or not ? If the right should be of any probable value, it
would be the duty of the assignee to take affirmative action to
sustain it, and make it available for the benefit of the creditors.
If it should be worthless, there would seem to be no reason why the
plaintiff, whose proceedings had been originally correct, should be
put to a useless additional expewse by reason of the conduct of an
opponent, in which he had no participation. There would seem to
be no good reason for infringing a useful rule merely because an
assignee might abuse or neglect his trust. Possibly, it might be a
violent presumption, that an assignee would ordinarily have actual
notice of the pendency of a suit against the bankrupt, particularly
where the initiatory proceedings in bankruptcy had been instituted
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against him without his concurrence. But since the passage of our
first statute, relative to filing notices of ls pendens, (Act of April
17, 1823, §11, p. 213,) a knowledge of the pendency of suits in
equity relative to real estate is easily attainable. The inventory of
the estate of a bankrupt, or of an insolvent debtor, would apprise
his assignee of the location and description of the real estate, and
if that should not set forth (as it did in this case) that it was the
subject of litigation, the fact might be readily ascertained at the
office of the Clerk of the proper county. The 3d section of the
Bankrupt Act of 1841 provided, that all suits in which the bankrupt is a party, might be prosecuted or defended by the assignee to
their conclusion, in the same way, and with the same effect, as they
might have been by the bankrupt. With the knowledge which he
could obtain from the notice of lia pendens, and the power to interfere in the suit given to him by the act, he could do full justice
to the creditors without being brought in as a party by the plaintiff.
Chancellor Walworth cites but one (and that American) authority
for his position, that the assignee of a bankrupt, constituted during
the pendency of a suit, must be made a party, in order that the
judgment should bind any part of the assigned property. It seems
to be the rule in lEngland, that bankruptcy in either party does not
abate the suit, whether in equity or at law. (1st Cooke's B. L., 621,
2, 3, 4; Hewitt and others, assignees of Robbins and others, bankrupts, vs. 2tianteZl, 2d Wilson R., 372, per Bathurst, J.) The
assignee may undoubtedly be let in to prosecute or defend the suit,
but it should be at his own option, and not at the instance of the
other party; and if he should not elect to interfere, the judgment
should nevertheless be valid. If the action should be against the
bankrupt, and for a claim which would be barred by his certificate,
he might avail himself of the defence even after judgment. But
surely no proceeding in bankruptcy could preclude the holder of a
mortgage from instituting or maintaing an action to coerce the
sale of the mortgaged property for the satisfaction of his debt.
The case cited by the Chancellor (Deas vs. Thorn, and others, 3d
Johns. R., 537,) is certainly a strong one, to show that the assignee
must be made a party, if the objection is raised during the progress
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of the suit; but it was not decided in that case, that if the action is
suffered to proceed without the addition or substitution of the
assignee as a party, a judgment would be ineffectual as to the assigned interest. The ordinary effect of a judgment in rem as to
real estate is, that it binds the original parties and those who may
have succeeded as purchasers to their interest, as to the subject
matter of the suit during its pendency, and it cannot be divested
of that attribute while it is suffered to stand. The judgment in the
foreclosure suit has not been assailed in its totality. The plaintiff
has not made any attempt to set it aside, or to procure a judicial
declaration of its entire nullity, but simply seeks to arrest one of
its conceded incidents. The decision in Deas vs. Torn had no
reference to real estate, to which the rule that purchasers during
the pendency of the suit are bound by a judgment against the
original parties from which they derive title is mainly if not exclusively applicable. The rule there laid down should not be
extended and applied to cases where it would be productive of
serious and often insurmountable difficulties. It frequently happens
in foreclosure suits, that some of the parties entitled to the equity
of redemption, or who have liens upon the mortgaged lands, are
residents of other States, or of parts unknown, and in the fluctuations of the present age, they may become bankrupts or insolvent
debtors, and find it necessary or expedient to take the benefit of
some act for the relief of such unfortunate persons during the progress of a suit. Now, if in such cases the judgments would be
ineffectual unless the assignees of the bankrupt or insolvent debtors
should be made defendants, it would be necessary to make repeated
searches in the offices where their papers would be filed, in the
States, districts or counties where they resided. Even then there
would not be absolute safety, as there might be many changes in a
remote State--such for instance as California-during the progress
of a letter containing the result of a search to the place of its destination. Under such a rule there could not in many cases be any
reasonable certainty for purchasers at sales in foreclosure suits:
however regular all might appear from available sources of information, some prowling assignee under an appointment made but a

-
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day before the decree of sale, might appear a year or two afterwards, and tender the money due on the mortgage, and thus defeat
the title of an innocent and indeed cautious purchaser altogether.
But the evil would extend further. Intended purchasers of real
estate, in their investigations as to title, would often have to extend
their inquiries beyond what have heretofore been considered as safe
limits ; and where a mortgage sale of recent date happens to be a
link in the chain, might have to hunt all over the Union to ascertain
whether some defendant in the foreclosure suit had not during its
pendency become a bankrupt or insolvent debtor, and made an
official or other assignment of his estate to some one who had not
been constituted a party. Inconvenience, it is true, forms no reason
for setting aside or disregarding a well settled rule. But where an
exception to a thoroughly established rule, not called for by, but in
opposition to, its letter, is claimed, the fact that it might be productive of great mischief is sufficient to prevent its allowance.
Upon the whole, I am satisfied that the equity of redemption of
McKibhin and Strong, and all claiming under them as purchasers,
whose title accrued after the notice of lis pendens in the foreclosure
suit was filed, including their assignee in bankruptcy, was effectually barred in that suit. It is therefore unnecessary that I should
consider the other questions discussed at the bar.
The complaint must be dismissed, with costs.
To this decision the plaintiff took the following exception:
"The plaintiff excepts to so much of the conclusion of law which
finds that the equity of redemption of ALcKibbin and Strong, and
all claiming under them as purchasers, whose title accrued after the
notice of lis pendens in the foreclosure suits was filed, including
their assignee in bankruptcy, was effectually barred by the decree
in that suit, so far as such conclusion affects the title of such
assignee in bankruptcy; becauseFirst.-Such assignee in bankruptcy took title by operation of
law, and not as purchaser, and that his equity of redemption, and
those holding under him, was not affected or barred by said notice
of lis pendens.
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Second.-The foreclosure decree was defective, null and void as
to said assignee in bankruptcy; and the present plaintiff, as such
assignee, was not a party to the foreclosure suit.
The plaintiff further excepts to the judgment entered in this
action pursuant to such conclusion of law."
An appeal being taken to the general term (Court in Bane,) and
heard before Justices Strong, Davies and Emott, and argued by
George Wood, for the appellant and
John H. Scott, for the repondents,
The following decisions, were made, embracing the judgment of
the court:
STRONG, J.-This is a most ungracious suit. The plaintiff, for
a nominal consideration, has intruded into matters in which he had
previously no concern, and now seeks, upon technical grounds,
to deprive the defendants of their property honestly and fairly
obtained, and which they were induced to purchase under titles
pursuant to and by virtue of a decree of a court of equity which had
remained unassailed for many years.
It is a material question, but one which I did not deem it necessary to consider when this case was formerly before me, and should
not now, but for the principal argument of the plaintiff's counsel,
whether, if the defendants' titles are imperfect, the plaintiff has
proved any right to impeach them? He claims the lands in dispute, or rather a right to redeem them, under a title of the two
mortgagors which it is alleged he has acquired pursuant to proceedings under the United States Bankrupt Act, approved August 19,
1841. Does the complaint or the proof establish such right ? I
speak now without reference to the legal effect of the foreclosure
suit. The mortgagors were declared bankrupt-one on the 16th
June, 1842, and the other on the 28th July in the same year; on
those days the interests of the bankrupts, whatever they were, in
the lands in dispute, vested in the general assignee. He then
acquired a right to defend the foreclosure suit which was pending
against the bankrupts, in the same way and with the same effect as
they might have acted (§ 3 of the Bankrupt Act,) of which I shall
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have something to say hereafter : he could sell, transfer and convey the bankrupt's property and rights of property, at such times
and in such manner as should be ordered and appointed by the
court in bankruptcy, (§ 9,) his deeds, containing proper recitals,
being declared to be as effectual to pass the title of the brankrupt
to the lands therein mentioned, to the purchaser, as if made by the
bankrupt himself immediately before such order, (§ 15,) and it is
declared (in § 8) that "no suit at law or in equity shall in any
case be maintainable by or against such assignee or by or against
any person claiming an adverse interest, touching the property and
rights of property aforesaid," (of the bankrupt,) "in any court
whatsoever, unless the same shall be brought within two years after
the declaration and decree of bankruptcy, or after the cause of suit
shall first have accrued."
The act qualifies the power of the assignee to sell and convey the
property of the bankrupt. He cannot do either without an order
of the court. In this case no such order is set forth or averred in
the complaint, nor was any such proved. The requisition is a
substantial one, not only because it is expressly provided by the
statute, but for the additional reason (if any was necessary,) that
the interests of the creditors-which are of some importance,
although they are not generally consulted as much as they should
be in these measures, (nor were they at all by the assignee in this
case,)-depend much upon a judicious disposition of the bankrupt's
property. Where the claim of title to real estate is solely through
a power, it must, in order to be sustainable, be proved that such
power was duly executed. If it is qualified by a condition precedent, it must appear that the condition was performed, or the
attempted exercise of it will prove ineffectual. In this case the
deeds from the assignee do not appear, but if they had been produced they would not have sufficiently proved an order of sale, even
if they had recited it, as the recitals in such deeds are only evidence of the bankruptcy, and the appointment of the assignee and
the consequent conveyance to him. The decisions of the courts in
this State are strong to show that in order to sustain a title alleged
to have been acquired under statutory proceedings, all the requisite
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preliminaries must have been adopted and must be proved. There
is no presumption in their favor where a change of title to real
estate is attempted to be established. The deeds from the assignee
under which the plaintiff claims, were executed by the assignee, the
one purporting to convey the estate of one of the bankrupts to the
plaintiff on the 24th of November, 1845, and two purporting to
convey the estate of the other bankrupt to one Clute, on the 5th
and 18th of March, 1856. Clute conveyed to the plaintiff by
deeds dated on the 7th and 19th of March in the same year. It
was admitted on the trial that the sales by the assignee were to
Clute on the 4th and 10th days of March, 1844, and to the plaintiff on the 25th of November, 1844. Both the sale and deed to the
plaintiff were made more than two years after the decree in bankruptcy; so were the two deeds to Clute.
The sales to him were made before the expiration of the two
years, but he acquired no rights under those official sales until the
deeds to him were executed. It is not perhaps material to consider
what must be deemed to be the date of the acquisition of the rights
of Clute, whatever they were, as his conveyances to the plaintiff
were not official; and as they were for lands then held adversely,
they were void. What rights, then, could the assignee convey,
when the deeds from him were given? The lands were held
adversely, and the assignee could not then maintain any suit at
law or in equity to recover them. (§ 8-before quoted.)
If his power to recover the lands had expired, could a deed from
him reserve it in favor of his grantee? He might have conveyed
lands sold adversely, (so far as it relates to the objection,) if he had
done so in season; but he had not done that. The limitation was
a part of the act, conferring upon the assignee all the power he had.
Could it have been the design of Congress that the assignee might
confer a right of action which he had suffered to expire, and thus
avoid the limitation, that would have evinced a disposition to
encourage maintenance, which is not to be presumed. The intentions were, no doubt, to exact vigilance, and to prevent the injustice
which might result from the exercise of the extraordinary powers
of assignees after a limited date. Both objects would be defeated
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if they could effectually revive rights of action which they had suffered to expire from lapse of time. It seems to me, then, that the
plaintiff derived no title to the lands in dispute, or right to maintain
an action to recover them under the conveyanee from the assignee.
I come now to the question which was principally agitated on the
trial, and which is certainly one of great importance, if titles to
real estate can be successfully assailed where they have been
acquired under judicial sales, on the ground that some one who
was originally a defendant in the suit, claiming an interest in, or
lien upon the land, had become a bankrupt or an insolvent during
the progress of the suit, and his assignee had not been made a
party, the rule will be productive of great inconvenience and uncertainty, and many estates which have been deemed secure may
be seriously jeopardized and property sometimes wholly defeated.
It has long been deemed settled law that a judgment in a suit in
rem binds not only the parties, but all who claim under them
through any means accruing after the commencement of the suit.
The rule is one of convenience, almost of necessity. If it should
be otherwise, suits where the defendants are numerous would be
almost interminable. In this case, where there are near five hundred defendants, the suit could not be brought to an end on behalf
of the plaintiff (if he has any merits,) if he was boand to notice
every change of interest and substitute the new names or claimants
as parties before judgment.
The general principle was admitted by his counsel on the argument, but he contended that it is inapplicable when the change is
by operation of law, as in cases of bankruptcy and insolvency.
There are certainly some strong cases in the English courts and in
our own, going to show, that under former bankrupt laws it was
necessary to make the assignees appointed pendente lite parties in
order to bind their interests. In England that would not be productive of much inconvenience, as the decrees in bankruptcy are
there made by a single tribunal, and a knowledge of them can be
easily attained. But under our system of 1841, there were as
many tribunals having cognizance of cases in bankruptcy as there
were States or district courts. It would impose an intolerable bur-
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then on plaintiffs, in cases where the defendants are numerous and
scattered over our immense country, to require separate examinations in the offices of the clerks of all the districts which would be
necessary, where the residence of any absent defendant should be
unknown. With us, then, a different rule of practice would seem
to be absolutely necessary; it is true that the argumentum ab
ineonvenienti cannot change a principle, but it may change a rule
of procedure, and particularly when it is an exception to a general
rule, formed mainly from convenience. Besides, our bankrupt act
differs essentially from the English system, and in particulars which
seem to call for a change of practice, if indeed it be a change. I
have alluded to one-the great number of tribunals; another is the
provision in the third section, to which I have before alluded, and
which is in the following words : " And all suits in law or in equity
then pending, in which such bankrupt is a party, may be prosecuted and defended by such assignee to its final conclusion in the
same way, and with the same effect, as they might have been by
such bankrupt." Now, this does not indicate a necessity for a
change of parties, but it expressly permits the suit to proceed to
judgment in the same way as it might have been done, but for the
proceeding in bankruptcy. It supposes, as seems to me, that it
might proceed against the original defendant notwithstanding his
bankruptcy, and with the like effect, but gives to the assignee the
control of it, and subjects it to his management so far as it relates
to the original rights and interests of the bankrupt. By the 11th
section oi the act, the assignee is authorized, under the direction of
the Court, to redeem and discharge any mortgage, and to tender a
due performance of the conditions thereof. Now, what further is
necessary for the protection of the bankrupt or his creditors?
Should there be any doubt as to the validity of the mortgage or
its preference over the interests of the bankrupt, the assignee may
interpose a defence in his name. Should the mortgage be for a
sum less than the value of the land, the assignee may redeem it,
or he may suffer the suit to proceed, and eventually claim any
surplus. The assignee had legal notice in this case. He had actual
notice of the pendency of the suit. If there is any defence, he has

CLEVELAND vs. BOERUM AND OTHERS.

an opportunity, and is bound to make it. If he should neglect his
duty, it would be most inequitable to make innocent purchasers, who
had nothing to do with the foreclosure suit, nor any right to control
it, suffer for his omission.
The fifteenth section of the act provides that the deeds of the
assignees should be as effectual to pass the title of the bankrupt to
the land therein mentioned, as fully to all intents and purposes, as
if made by the bankrupt himself immediately before the order
(decree) in bankruptcy. This would seem to assimilate the effect
of the deed by the assignee to that of a conveyance by the bankrupt himself before the decree in bnkruptcy; and where such conveyance is made, no change or substitution of parties is necessary.
By our system of foreclosing mortgages of real estate in a court
of equity, the decree nominally binds the interests which the
defendants had at the commencement of the suit. The notice of
lis pendens which the law requires, prevents the rule from operating
injuriously to subsequent cautious purchasers or encumbrancers.
Persons desirous of acquiring new interests in the property, or
those who become entitled to any such interests by operation of
law, can by due inquiry ascertain the existence and nature of the
suit, and can, if they deem it proper, adopt all necessary measures
to protect their rights. If they will not move in the matter, why
should others assume that their alleged acquisition is lawful, and
therefore incur additional expense and delay ? It is far more reasonable to require those claiming a new right from any cause whatever, to assert it promptly, or to forfeit it altogether. The bankrupt
act of 1841, I think, contemplated such notice by the assignees, and
required no affirmative notice by the plaintiffs in existing suits.
But, if there was any irregularity in the foreclosure suit, in not
making the assignee a party-and it is so at first designated by
Chancellor Walworth, in the case of Johnson vs. Fitzhugh (3 Barb.
Ch. R., 376)-the assignee might have moved within the year
allowed by the Revised Statutes, but not after that, to set aside the
decree (2 R. S. 359.) The Chancellor afterwards says, that the
decree is a nullity, as to the assignee; and so it may be, so far as
it relates to any requisition for affirmative action by him ; but I
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doubt much the correctness of a subsequent remark of his, that it
could not foreclose the equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises. Certainly, the effect of the decree as it stands is to foreclose
/ the equity of redemption, which the bankrupt had at the cornmencement of the suit; and, if that effect should for any cause be
inequitable or wrong, a movement should be to set it aside. It
cannot be deprived of its legal effect as it stands, without impugning the faith due to our records. Judgments may be assailed for
something dehors the record, as fraud in obtaining them, or want
of interest in the plaintiff, but that must be by a direct procedure,
and not in a collateral suit. The wisdom of that rule is strongly
illustrated by the facts of this case. If the decree of foreclosure
had been set aside under a direct attack by the assignee, the equity
of redemption might have produced a considerable amount for the
creditors. But the sale of it, under the dark cloud of the decree,
produced the paltry sum of two dollars and fifty cents, and the
large profit which would result, if this suit should be sustained,
would go to a prowling assignee. I am satified that no court would
have directed or sanctioned a sale under such circumstances, and it
is a matter of especial wonder that it was ever made by any
assignee.
The judgment should be affirmed.
E o T, J.-I concur in affirming this judgment, for the reason
that no order of the court in bankruptcy for the sale of the interest
of the bankrupts in the mortgaged premises is averred or. proved
by the plaintiff. I regard the ninth section of the Bankrupt Act
of 1841, which directs that all sales and transfers of the bankrupt
property "shall be made at such times and in such manner as
shall be ordered and appointed by the court in bankruptcy," as
not merely conferring on the court the power to make such orders,
if it should see fit to do so, but as requiring to the validity of any
such sale, the order and sanction of the court. In other words, the
general assignee did not possess absolute power to dispose of the
property of bankrupts at his discretion. His sales and transfers
must have been directed and sanctioned by the court, and this must
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appear to sustain their validity where they are a source of title.
Whether this was to be done or was done, by general rule, or by
special orders in each case, is a question upon which we need not
enter, as there is in this case no allegation or proof of either.
The conclusion at which I have arrived on this point, renders it
unnecessary to examine the other questions in the case.

In the Sutpreme Court of Pennsylvania.
SUNBURY AND

ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY

VS. LEWIS COOPER.

1

1. Specific performance is not a proper form of remedy for refusal to carry out a
contract for the purchase of bonds of an Improvement Corporation ; there being
ordin-rily an adequate remedy by the common law action for damages. But
those courts that have original jurisdiction of the cause of action, and authority
to follow both equity and common law forms, may give redress in such a case in
the equity form, if there be no demurrer to the form.
2. Specific performance of a contract to purchase bonds of the Delaware Division
Canal Company, is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
bacne; but at Nisi Prius they have original jurisdiction of such a breach of contract, and may give redress in the equity form, if there be no demurrer to the
form.
3. The legislative pledges of the public faith, and of the public works and their
income, as security for the money borrowed to construct the works, is not a contract that can be enforced by the judiciary of the State.
4. -No court has authority to entertain a question that involves a charge of fraud in
the legislature, as a means of setting aside a public law passed by it.
5. A party who has obtained the passage of a private Act of Assembly by bribery,
imposition or other fraudulent means, would, perhaps, not be entitled to any
benefit from it, if the fraud be shown.
6. No court has authority to entertain a charge of dishonest motives against the
legislature as a means of showing that any act of legislation is unconstitutional.
7. The legislature has authority to sell the public works constructed by the State,
and the courts have no authority to declare the sale void for inadequacy of price,
or for any undue favor to local interests supposed to have influenced the sale.
8. The Act of Assembly, of 21st April, 1858, authorizing the sale of the State
Canals, is not unconstitutional.

This case was argued at Sunbury on the 6th of October last,
before Chief Justice Lowrie and Judges Strong, Thompson and
1 We are indebted to the Pittsburg "Legal Journal"

Law Rey.

for this case.-Eds. Am.
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Porter. Judge Woodward did not sit in the case, being a stockholder in the Sunbury and Erie Railroad'Company. Qn the part
of complainants, the argument was conducted by Charles Gibbons
and Hon. John 0. Knox, Attorney-general of Pennsylvania, and
on behalf of respondents, by Wim. L. -irst and lion. J. S. Black,
U. S. Attorney-general.
The important points raised, are all fully set forth in the opinion.
The opinion of the court was delivered at Pittsburgh, November 5, 1858, by
LowRIE, Cin. J.-The plaintiff is possessed of a large amount of
bonds issued by the Delaware Division Canal Company, and has
qontracted to sell one hundred thousand dollars of them to the defendant; but he refuses to perform his contract, and the plaintiff
has brought this bill in equity, to compel him to perform it.
We know of no law giving the Supreme Court in bane original
jurisdiction over such a cause of action as this, and we must not
assume it. This is not a proper case for this equitable form of
remedy, for we can see no reason why the damages that are
recoverable in the common law foim, are not an adequate redress
for the breach of contract: and if it were otherwise, this cause,
being instituted at Philadelphia, is required by law to pass through
the Nisi Prius before it can properly come in bane.
Though we do not regard the case as a proper one for the application of this equitable form of remedy, yet the Nisi Prius has
jurisdiction of the cause of action, and it may give redress in the
equity form, if the defendant does not demur to the form, even
though the common law form is the more appropriate one.
Brightly's Equity, § 24. The court in bane has original jurisdiction of some classes of cases, if brought in the equity form, and
not if brought in the common law form, and there the form is an
essential element of the jurisdiction ; but it is not so in the inferior
courts which have original jurisdiction of the cause of action irrespective of the form.
We are, therefore, of opinion that this cause may be tried and
decided in Nisi Prius ; and as we heard it fully argued in bane
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before adverting to the foregoing considerations, and as it is a case
of great and pressing importance, it will be decided there by the
judge of the court who shall next hold that one, on his opinion
drawn up -with the concurrence of the three judges who heard the
argument, and will be subject to appeal to a full bench. If the
parties desire to be heard again, the case may be argued on appeal
with more direct reference to the views now to be expressed, and
with the aid of the experience derived from the argument already
had.
The case comes up on bill and answer, and, therefore, there is no
dispute about the evidence.
The plaintiff became the purchaser, under the act of 21st of
April 1858, of certain canals belonging to the State, and sold a
part of them to the Delaware Division Canal Company, and in
consideration thereof, received the bonds, which it afterwards contracted to sell to the defendant, aud which he refuses to take and
pay for. Has he a sufficient excuse for this refusal ?
The defendant founds his refusal on the allegation tht the
plaintiff had no valid title to the canal sold to the Delaware
Division Canal Company, and that, therefore, the bonds in question
given by them on their purchase, are liable to a defence for failure
of consideration ; and this allegation is attempted to be sustained
by various arguments, which we now proceed to consider.
1. It is urged that, when the State was contracting her public
debt in constructing her canals, she pledged their income for the
payment of the principal and interest thereof, and that she cannot,
in good faith to her creditors, part with that income for any other
purpose.
This objection assumes that this sale is an improper one, and is
really a diversion of the pledge, and we may, for the present,
allow it the advantage of this assumption. It assumes, moreover,
that this court has some sort of authority, directly or indirectly, to
enforce the pledge ; and this we are not prepared to admit.
How the objection might be answered, as a question of morals,
we are not to discuss ; for we can exercise no authority on that
ground in this case. If this court has no legal or constitutional
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authority to enforce the pledge, we have none to declare that it has
been violated; and most certainly no such authority has been
proved to us, and we know of none. The State also pledged its
faith and credit for the same purpose; and it would not be pretended that we have authority to enjoin the Legislature to respect
this part of the pledge by providing adequate taxation. For such
a pledge, as well as for the one insisted on, the remedy is a moral
one, to be enforced by means of the moral sense of the community
operating upon the Legislature, and by means of the moral sense
of the civilized world operating upon both the people and the
Legislature-an influence and responsibility to 'hich all States
are subject.
2. It is objected that the act of the 21st April, 1858, is a palpable fraud upon the people of the State and that, therefore, this
sale, made under it, and depending upon it, is voidable.
In support of this objection, the following facts are relied on:That works, producing a net revenue which represents a principal of over nine millions of dollars, are sold for three and a half
millions:
That they are sold to a railroad corporation that has proved
itself totally unable, for want of capital, to build even the half of
its own road :
That, though part of the consideration is, for awhile, to be
secured on the works sold ; yet, in the end, this security is to be
withdrawn, and a mortgage of seven millions, on a still unfinished
railroad, is to be substituted ; one-half of which is for the security
of the State, and the other half for the security of persons from
whom the Company may hereafter borrow money, at any rate of
discount, to complete their road ; and thus even the consideration
money is risked upon the chances of a finished and successful road,
and by sharing with subsequent creditors the benefit of the mortgage security, when it might have been abundantly and very
naturally secured by a mortgage on the works sold :
That the canals are sold to the plaintiff, not to be retained and
managed, but to be resold at advanced prices, to the profit of the
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plaintiff, and in such a form as to allow the plaintiff to have the
ability to pledge them as security for money to be borrowed:
That these and other facts show that the act of Assembly, instead
of being what it professes to be-a simple sale of the public
works-is fraudulently intended as an act in aid of the Sunbury
and Erie Railroad Company:
That its passage was secured by improper influences brought to
bear on the members of the Legislature ; the interests of the State
having been sacrificed to local interests on the line of the road ; to
the interests of Philadelphia, which is a large stockholder ; to the
interests along the line of the Allegheny Valley Railroad, which is
to be aided by a subscription of half a million of dollars ; and to the
interests along the North Branch, by reason of a preference that is
given to the inhabitants there, in the resale of the North Branch
division.
Certainly, these facts present a case that justifies an argument
in support of the proposition, that the act of assembly was not
passed for the mere purpose of selling the public works, but mainly
in aid of the Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company; that its passage was secured by the influence of private, or, at least, local
interests, to the prejudice of the interests of the State ; and they
furnish elements for the argument that it is a fraud upon the people. But is this the proper tribunal to try such a question ? May
the judiciary sit in judgment upon a charge that the Legislature
have been faithless to their oaths, to the constitution, and to the
public interests, by passing a law that is a fraud upon the State ?
This question was not discussed, and yet, unless it can receive an
affirmative answer, all the argument on this branch of the subject
must be regarded as out of place.
We cannot hesitate a moment on this question. We have no
such authority, and ought not to have. However far the Legislature may depart from the right line of constitutional morality,
we have no authority to supervise and correct their acts on the mere
ground of fraudulent or dishonest motives. We know of no such
check upon legislation, and would not desire to see such a one instituted. The remedy for such an evil is in the hands of the people
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alone, to be worked out by an increased care to elect representatives that are honest and capable. If the judiciary have such
authority, then every justice of the peace is competent to sit in
judgment upon every act of legislation which disorderly moralists
or knavish or ignorant anarchists may choose to charge as fraudulent. Nay, more, if the question may he ra'sed in a judicial proceeding, the judges and juwtices of the peace will be bound to
investigate and decide it; and the principal judicial business might
then become that of testing, not cases by the standard of the law,
but the standard itself, by the infinitely various and uncertain
judicial notions of morality.
And notice, the principal element of fraud charged here is, that
members gave undue prominence to local interests ; that is, that
they regarded too much the wishes and interests of their constituents. In order to condemn this, there must be some rule of
law declaring that undue devotion to the interests of constituents
is a fraud upon the State ; and there must, besides, be judges possessed of supreme indifference to such interests, and capable of
precisely defining what, for each case, is undue devotion. It is
very easy to see that a power having such control over legislative
motives would be destructive of all free legislation, and seriously
obstructive of social development.
We do not say that a party, who has obtained the passage of a
private act of assembly by bribery, imposition, or other fraudulent
means, can claim any benefit from it, if the fraud be shown; perhaps this would be treated in the same manner as a judgment in
court, as a title from the land office obtained by fraud.
But here is no pretence of fraudulent practices by the purchaser
of the canals.
The legislature, on its own motion, and for its own reasons, tendered the bargain on certain terms, and these terms were accepted.
The motives of the Legislature in so doing, cannot be inquired into
by the courts.
3. It is further objected that the act of assembly is unconstitutional, and therefore no valid title to the canals can be made
under it.
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The argument in support of this objection is founded on the same
facts that were insisted on, as evidence of fraud, in support of the
objection which we have just considered.
Now, it is urged that these facts prove that the act of assembly
is not, in truth, for the sale of the canals, but in aid of the Sunbury and Erie Railroad. Company, by means that are forbidden by
the constitution ; that a sale of the canals at less than half their
value, to a railroad company without means, and with a road projected which it cannot possibly finish without aid; a sale made with
the expressed intention that the canals shall be re-sold at a profit to
the railroad company, and under an arrangement by -which the
price is to be secured on the railroad alone, and by which the prospective debts of the company are to be of equal LIEN with the price
to be paid to the State; a sale effected, not by public biddings,
where competition is invited, but by an act of assembly fixing all
the terms, and carried by the influence of local interests, some of
which are illegitimately and unnaturally brought into connection
with the scheme of the act ; it is insisted that this is no sale at all,
but a gift, or mainly a gift, of the canal to the railroad company,
and is forbidden by the constitutional amendments of 1857, which
dedicate the income or proceeds of the sale of the public works to
the sinking fund for the payment of the public debt.
Here again, and under a different aspect, the sincerity and
honesty of the Legislature, in the performance of their duties, is
attempted to be made a question of judicial cognizance; and again
we say that we have no jurisdiction of such a question, and can
have no right to express any official opinion in relation to it.
Official morality in us requires that we shall not assume authority
to judge of the official morality of the Legislature. For the faithfulness and honesty of their public acts, we repeat, they are responsible to the public alone, and not by means of a trial before the
courts.
We must interpret their acts as they intended them, to be interpreted. They declare this to be a sale, and we are not to attribute
to the Legislature improper motives, in order to construe it a gift.
It is a sale in a very ordinary form, by means of a proposal made
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and accepted. This might be a better means of sale than it would
be to put the canals .up at auction to the highest bidder ; for such
large sales require large combinations of capital, and these combinations might easily be formed so as to exclude competition.
The Legislature, alone, has the authority to select the form of the
sale, and if it chooses, the form of proposal and acceptance of
terms-it, alone, can make the proposal.
The amendments to the constitution dedicate the proceeds of the
sale to the Sinking Fund; but they, in no particular, limit the
legislative authority to sell. In this matter it is the supreme
authority in the State ; its act is the act of the State by its legitimate organ ; in that act it had a discretion, to exercise which, the
Courts cannot, without usurpation, review or criticise. Every
owner of property may sell it at as low a price as he pleases ; may
favor whom he pleases in the bargain; may regard other than mere
financial interests; and the people may do the same with their property; and the Legislature, acting for them, are the judges of what
the people themselves would do. The courts cannot investigate
the justice of their judgment. This may be a sale for a very
inadequate price, and on very inadequate security ; but certainly it
is a sale and not a gift. It may have been induced by motives that
sacrifice the public interests of the people to mere local ones; but
these motives cannot, in their nature, be the subject of judicial cognizance.
It does not legally vitiate a contract that there are other motives
for it in the minds of the parties besides the consideration named
in it. Almost all contracts have such motives. A man may sell
his house or his horse because he does not wish to keep it, or does
it under some moral or financial necessity of parting with it, or
thinks that it will better suit another to use it, or take care of it,
as well as because he is getting a price for it in money or other
valuable things. It is still a sale, notwithstanding these private
motives, and though the price may be a low one. And a State, as
well as an individual, may have motives for a sale, independent of
price; and it is the Legislature that is to ascertain and act upon
these motives. This is a part of their duty in every act of legis-
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lation. They must express and act upon the motives of the people
in every exercise of their legitimate authority. Whether they do
it well and faithfully, or not, the people must judge ; for they have
instituted no authority to do it for them.
Such an authority is, in fact, impracticable. In the very nature
of human institutions, people must trust very largely to the good
faith and devotion of their public agents, if they would have a govern]
ment that is worth anything. They cannot have an efficient government, if they do not allow it a large freedom in its movements.
And they cannot have honest and honorable men in office, if they
are to be always suspected by the people, because of their office.
And if the people choose dishonest men for public positions, no
amount of suspicion and no system of checks will be adequate to
save them from the evils and costs of a dishonest government.
Legislative motives may be immoral and faithless; but acts alone
can be unconstitutional. Motives belong to our interior morality,
and are not naturally subject to legal regulation ; and so far as the
State attempts it, all liberty of conscience is endangered. Morality
regards action and its motives, while law regards the action alone.
Law does not sanction or allow improper motives, but it is incompetent to reach them; they belong to the forum of conscience.
Law has no condemnation for acts that are not unlawful, while
morality takes higher ground, and condemns conduct if its motives
be bad.
Acts that are not forbidden by the constitution, in form or substance, cannot be constitutionally condemned, because of the
motives that induce them. No human conduct could stand such a
test, and no human skill could be trusted to apply it. If we should
attempt it here, it might well be asked, "Who art thou that judgest
another man's servant ? to his own master he standeth or falleth."
Laws and constitutions are designed as means of social order
and harmony ; but they would be the very reverse of this, if no act
could be justified under them, until its motives should be ascertained and approved. Law, the more it undertakes to test conduct
by motives, the more it is apt to be disorderly and tyrannical. It
does sometimes pass judgment upon malicious and fraudulent
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motives, when it finds external acts clearly indicating them, and in
such cases especially it is often cruelly oppressive in its conclusions. We cannot thus try legislative acts. To judge of their
validity by motives would be impossible, for the prevailing motive
in the mind of every member might be different.
It was attempted, in the argument, to test the validity of the act
of assembly, by applyiug to it the somewhat analagous private
relation of principal and agent, but the test is inappropriate. A
private agent to sell, simply acts out the motives, known or
unknown, of his principal; whereas a legislator has generally to
seek, in his own experience and observation, for the motives which
ought to justify his acts, and to be satisfactory to the public.
Moreover, the judicial authority of the State is instituted to judge
of the fulfilment of the duties of private relations, and not to decide
whether legislatures 'have faithfully fulfilled theirs; though, as
judicial authority, it may protect private rights even against legislative acts, if they are forbidden by the constitution.
In view of what we have now said, it seems to us that the remaining points of the case may be briefly disposed of.
We do not perceive that, by the sale under this act of assembly, the State assumes the debt of any corporation, or lends her
credit to any, or becomes a stockholder in, or joint owner with any.
The sole foundation of the arguments to establish these points is,
that the price and the security are inadequate. But on this subject
we are not authorized to supervise or review the discretion and
judgment of the Legislature. If we could supervise it, we could
direct and control it, and we have not this much authority over the
political discretipn even of municipal corporations. If the price
and security had been adequate, in the judgment of the objectors,
they could have found no footing for the argument which they have
made. They have not attempted to prove that this court has
authority to decide this fundamental question.
The subscription that is required to the Allegheny Valley Railroad, and the preference given on a re-sale to the inhabitants along
the North Branch, may have been motives inducing the act, in
whole or in part ; but they are not part of the legal consideration
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of the sale. It may be that some members may have thought that
a connection of the Sunbury and Erie with the Allegheny Valley
Road, would be a valuable one, and would increase the security of
the debt to the State; and that the North Branch Canal would be
the best managed for the public good by being owned by the people
of the neighborhood. But we are not called upon to ascertain or
account for legislative motives, for we could not sit in judgment
upon them, even if we knew them. A law that the Legislature
may make, we must obey, whatever may have been their motives,
even though it be a very unwise one.
The provision, under which the company contracts to pay the
State three-fourths of the profits of a re-sale of the canals, does not
make the State a joint owner with the company of the canals. She
reserves no title in them, in any sense, that could have been meant
by the constitution. It is a sale out and out, but with a contract
to increase the price in a certain event. The company's share of
the profits of re-sale may be unreasonable, but of this the Legislature, alone, could judge in making its proposal of sale.
We are, therefore, of opinion that no valid, legal, or constitutional objection has been suggested against the title granted
under the act of assembly, and that none of those which have been
made can be maintained either by State creditors, or tax payers,
or the Canal Commissioners; and at the next iNisi Prius we shall
direct a decree in favor of the plaintiff, according to the prayer of
the bill. We declare our opinion now in advance, in order that
the parties may have the more time to consider the subject preparatory to a re-argument on appeal to the court in bane, if they
shall think an appeal advisable.

lIn the District Court for the City of Philadelphia.
AGNEW vs. THE INSURANCE COMPANY.
A loss which arises from the efforts made to prevent goods from being destroyed
by fire, must be borne by the assurer, and not by the insured, whether the particular injury in question be produced by water used to extinguish the flames, or
results from dangers, such as theft, to which the prorerty is exposed in an
attempt to remove it to a place of safety.
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The opinion of the court upon the motion for a new trial, was
delivered by
J.-The defendants contend that even if the verdict is in
other respects correct, there was still manifest error in instructing
the jury, that if it became and was necessary to remove the goods
from the building in order to prevent their destruction by fire, and
if in the course of such removal they were lost or destroyed, although
by theft, the insurers would be answerable for a sacrifice made for
their benefit, and bound to make good the injury occasioned by it
to the insured. The policy is said to be against fire and not against
theft, even when resulting from or occasioned by fire, and the maxim,
causa proxima non remota spectatur is cited as an unanswerable
argument in favor of the insurers. This argument would possess
more force, and might perhaps be unanswerable, if the maxim thus
relied on, which is perhaps always true as against the insurers, were
equally conclusive in their favor. It is always true as against the
insurers, because those who stipulate or undertake to indemnify
against a thing are answerable for it; whether it be a cause or a
consequence, or be both consequence and cause; but it is not necessarily conclusive in their favor, because those who undertake to
indemnify ajainst a thing also make themselves answerable for its
natural and legitimate consequences. Thus it is well settled that
under an insurance against the perils of the seas, the insurers must
respond for every loss, which those perils occasion, even when it has
its remote but efficient cause in the negligence of the insured, which
as a proximate cause is not covered by the policy of insurance.
Here the maxim proxima non remota has its full operation, and the
immediate cause is alone regarded to the exclusion of the more remote.
When, however, tobacco insured against the perils of the seas was
injured in flavor by the decomposition of hides, which had been
occasioned in its turn by the access of a quantity of sea water during
a storm, judgment was given against the insurers, because the ultimate cause was sea damage, and being answerable for it, they were
necessarilr answerable for its consequences. Montoya vs. The
-London Assurance Company, 6 Exchequer, 451. "I think," said
Pollock, C. B., in delivering his opinion in this case, "that it may
HARE,
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be laid down as a general rule, that when mischief arises from the
perils of the seas, and the natural and almost inevitable consequence
of that mischief is to create further mischievous results, the underwriters in such cases are responsible for the further mischief so occasioned." Indeed the defendants themselves admit their liability for
that portion of the goods which were damaged-by water in the effort
made to save them from being destroyed by fire; thus tacitly conceding that we may look beyond the immediate cause, when it is a
necessary consequence of the more remote, and that the necessity,
which ties them together, and makes both virtually one, need not
lie in material or physical causation, but may equally well be found
in the laws of the mind, and the discharge of a moral obligation.
Few things are farther apart than fire and water, and an injury
produced by the affusion of the one, cannot be viewed as the necessary consequence of the existence of the other, unless we look beyond
material causes to those which sway the mind. The inference would
therefore seem direct and irresistible, that if an insurance solely
against fire, covers a loss by water, when it is a result or consequence
of fire, it may also extend to other consequences, which have the
same origin. In the present instance the jury must be taken to
have found, and the evidence in the case shows, that the loss of that
portion of the goods, which were stolen during their removal fr-om
the store, was as much occasioned by the fire as that of the residue,
which were suffered to remain, and which were destroyed not by the
fire, but by the water thrown on for the purpose of extinguishing
the fire; and it would seem to follow that the liability, which is conceded to exist for the latter, must also extend to and embrace the
former.
The argument for the plaintiff, however, does not stop here, but
rests on another and broader basis which stretches farther and has
a more extensive operation, than most other principles known to the
science of jurisprudence. I speak of the rule that a sacrifice made
by one man for the benefit of another, and in pursuance of a legal
duty or obligation, must be made good by the party for whom it is
incurred. The extent and'importance of this principle may be estimated by a reference to Story's Equity jurisprudence, vol. 1st, sec-
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tion 469, 470; where it is shown to pervade the whole circle of
human relations, and to be applied with great liberality both by law
and equity, whenever the circumstances are such as to call it into
operation. A great number of instances are cited by the learned
commentator as exemplifications of the general rule, and among
them that of general average, which is said to have its foundation
in common with the rest, in the sentiment of natural justice, rather
than in contract, and to form part of the jurisdiction of equity,
although originating in the first instance in the exigencies of marine
navigation, and forming one of the doctrines of the maritime law.
Unless some valid distinction can be taken between fire and marine
insurance, the same rule must prevail in both, and entitle the insured
to an indemnity for sacrifices made for the preservation of the
property a. risk, whether the disaster occur in the streets of a town,
or on that broader highway, which is the path of intercommunication
between nations.
In Wells vs. The Boston insurance Company, 6 Pick. 132, the
insurers were held answerable for the loss of a number of blankets,
which had been voluntarily exposed to destruction, for the purpose
of preventing the fire from spreading to the property insured,
although the blankets themselves were not covered by the insurance,
thus showing that the equitable principle, which lies at the foundation of the doctrine of general average, embraces both sea and land
in its operation, and is equally applicable to fire and marine insurance. The court said that the loss did not fall within the contract,
but that the defendants were not the less liable, so far as the sacrifice from which it resulted was incurred for their benefit. And we
shall not be wrong in looking to the general perception which men
have of this principle, for the concurrence of all parties in the position, that the insured ought not to be placed in a worse position by
performing his duty and putting out a fire, than he would have been
by suffering it to burn on unchecked, and that the insurers should
consequently be answerable for the damage done by the water
employed to extinguish the flames. The argument is nearly if not
quite as strong, when the goods are lost or injured in removing them
from the fire, as when they are damaged in the course of the efforts
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made to extinguish it, and no sound distinction can, as it would seem,
be drawn, between those cases where the loss is occasioned by theft,
and those where it occurs in any other way. If duty requires the
occupants of a house about to be destroyed by fire, to carry their
property out of the door or even to throw it from the windows,
rather than permit it to become a prey to the flames, they ought
not to be losers by fulfilling the obligation thus imposed upon them ;
nor can it make any matter whether the injury arises from the fracture of a mirror or other piece of furniture, by the fall, or the
abstraction of a bale of goods, after it reaches the pavement, by a
thief.
For these reasons my mind inclines strongly to the opinion, that
a loss arising from the efforts made to prevent goods from being
destroyed by fire, should be borne by the insurers and not by the
insured, whether the particular injury in question is produced by the
water used to extinguish the conflagration, or results from the dangers
to which goods are exposed during an attempt to remove them to a
place of safety. The difficulty arises from the absence of precedent,
and the consequent necessity of relying on the conclusions of the
individual reason, always an unsafe guide, when deciding pro re nata,
and unaided by the light thrown by previous decision, which when
tried by time and tested by experience, is the best safeguard against
error, if not always an infallible guide to truth.
No aid can be derived from the case of Billier vs. The Allegheny
Insurance Company, 3 Barr, 470, because the building was not
actually on fire, the removal having been made as a mere measure
of precaution, against a danger which never actually happened, and
the decision simply establishes the obvious proposition, that the
insurers are not answerable, unless the peril arises within the limits
of the risk, as defined and covered by the policy. Case vs. The
HartfordInsurance Company, 13 Ill. 676, is much more nearly in
point, and goes very far to sustain the view which I have taken, but
is not, of course, binding as an authority beyond the jurisdiction of
the court by which it was decided. I therefore concur with my
brethren in preferring that the question should be carried by a bill
of exceptions to the Supreme Court, where alone it can receive a
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final decision. We therefore discharge the rule for a new trial, as
the best, and indeed the only means, of enabling the parties to bring
the case at once before a higher and ultimate tribunal.
Rule discharged.
In the Putnam (Indiana) Circuit Court.
ANDERSON, M'LEAN & COMPANY

VS. ALEXANDER ET. AL.

1. It seems that the common law right of issuing paper, representing money, and
to be used as currency by private bankers, has never had any existence by the
usages of this country, such paper having uniformly been issued by the government, or by banks authorized by government.
2 By the Constitution of Indiana, no bank of issue can be established, except a
State bank, and free or private banks, pursuant to the general banking law.
3. It hence appears that an association of individuals, for the purpose of banking,
not in pursuance of any statute law, is an illegal institution.

The opinion of the Court, in which the facts fully appear, was
delivered by PERKINS, J.
This is a suit to recover the amount of certain notes purporting
to be issued by the Citizens' Bank of Gosport. The suit is against
the stockholders of the bank in their individual capacity. The
main ground of defence is, that the bank is an illegal institution,
and its issues void. The bank was organized by an association of
individuals, for the purpose of doing a general banking business,
including the issuing of notes to circulate as money. Engraved
plates were procured, bills of various denominations, payable to
bearer, in the exact similitude of bank-notes, printed, issued, and
put into circulation by the company. No securities were filed with
the Auditor of the State. The organization was not, and was not intended to be, in pursuance of any statute law. And these questions
are presented by the case:
1. Is the right to issue bills to circulate as money, a natural or
common law right?
2. If so, is it placed under restrictions by our constitution and
statutes ?
3. If so, and the bills were issued without authority of law, are
the issuers legally liable to pay them ?
Banking originated in the exercise of a natural or common law
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right, as does, perhaps, every other pursuit, and was called into existence by the wants of the public. It at first consisted in receiving
money on deposit, loaning it to customers, buying and selling bills
of exchange, &c. For money deposited, the bankers gave notes or
certificates. These passed from hand to hand, represented actual
cash, were called bank or bankers' notes, and hence, as a bank note
in its origin, represented money, bank notes came, by usage, to be
considered as and taken for money. Subsequently, with the growth
of commerce, bankers adopted the practice of issuing their notes,
not for sums of money actually deposited, but upon their own
credit made payable to bearer. These notes circulated as money.
The issue of such notes, it seems, according to the National
Cyclopedia, a work appearing to be but an abridgment of a
much better one under a more humble title, the Penny Cyclopcedia, was engrafted into the business of private banking. But in
1694 the bank of England was established by the government, and
to protect it in the enjoyment of its privileges, private banking in
England passed under the control of statutes, and the right in
private bankers to issue paper as a circulating medium was restrained. It ceased in that country to be exercised, and strictly
private banking became limited to the functions of banks of deposit
and discount.
At the period of the establishment of business houses in the
North American Colonies, private banks in England did not practice
issuing paper to be used as currency. The first issues of paper
money here were made by the Colonial and Continental governments,
and the second, and all or nearly all subsequent issues were by
banks chartered by those or succeeding state or national governments. It may be laid down as a general proposition, that, in this
country, paper money has been issued only by government, or
banks authorized by government. Such has been the practice in
this state, and perhaps it might be safely asserted that the common
law right of issuing such paper by private bankers never had an
existence in this country. But without determining this point, we
proceed to inquire whether the right exists under the present constitution and laws of Indiana.
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The subject of banking was a prominent one before the convention
that framed our present constitution. The members were divided
upon it into three parties:
1. The hard money men-opposed to all bank paper-all banks
of issue.
2. Those who wished the issue of such paper to be confined exclusively to a bank chartered by the state.
3. Those who were opposed to any monopoly in the business, but
desired it should be open to all the citizens-that banks should be
organized upon free trade principles.
The two parties favoring banks of issue, introduced their respective propositions-one for a State bank, the other for free banks.
The latter was in these words : "The business of banking shall be
free to all, on such terms and restrictions as the legislature shall
impose by general laws for such purpose, including the following
principles, which shall be obligatory upon all persons, associations
or corporations acting under such general laws." Deb. Con., vol.
2, p. 1414.
In discussing the subject, some of the members of the convention
appeared to regard the right to issue bank paper for purposes of
circulation as a franchise to be granted by the government; others
as a natural or common law right, but one so liable to abuse, as to
require stringent restrictions upon its exercise. Thus, Mr. Rariden
said : "The free system is based upon the natural rights of man,
under the idea that what is done by man as a citizen may be done
by man as a banker. Its friends say they only want to negative
certain rights and powers in that branch of business-that it is to
be left open and free to all-that whosoever will pledge securities,
&c.-this is called free to all."
1Mr. Kelso-" The plan, as I understand it, is this, or about this:
A general law is to be passed by the legislature, authorizing any
and all, who choose to go to banking; not however without restrictions; and one of their strongholds is the security they offer to
the billholder."
Judge Howe-" Now, as to the question of monopoly, that also
will be entirely obviated. Under a law of this kind, every one will
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have a right to bank if he has money enough. All the privileges
that have ever been given to a bank, are the rights to sue and be
sued in its corporate capacity, and to issue bills. The right of
banking is a right which every man has at common law, and this
system, instead of extending the right, restricts it. It is a restriction of all banking."
Professo Bead-"I shall, sir, favor those restrictions, which, in
my opinion, will the most certainly secure these principles, (a return
to a specie currency, &c.,) and at length bring the country to the
true commercial and constitutional medium of exchange. By the
general adoption of a species of securities which will gradually
disappear, this object will be accomplished, and banking will be restored to its legitimate sphere, which is not the emitting and circulation of bills of credit." Other members expressed like sentiments.
2 vol. Deb. Con., from p. 1414 to 1640.
It clearly appears from the whole discussion, that those members
who regarded the right to issue bills at franchise, considered that
it could only be exercised, as of course it could only be, under a
grant from the legislature, and that those who held it a natural
right, regarded the constitution they were framing as a restriction
upon the exercise of the right otherwise than in a manner to be
prescribed by the legislature. Both regarded the constitution as
controlling the subject.
When the propositions came to a vote, the hard money men
voted with the free bank men against the State bank section, and
with the State bank men against the free bank section, and thus at
first defeated both. The free and State bank men then combined
and adopted both sections, substantially as introduced.
They provide that the legislature may create a State bank by
charter of incorporation, with power to issue bills. This was the
proposition of the State bank men. And "2. No banks shall be
established otherwise than under a general banking law, except" a
state bank; which law shall provide for the registry and countersigning, by an offier of State, "of all paper credit designed to be
circulated as money," &c. This was the proposition of the free
This historical view enables us at
bank men-Const., Art. IX.
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once to determine the effect to be given to the section of the constitution touching general banking. It was designed to operate
on individuals is well as upon the legislature. It prohibits all
banking, by way of issuing bills, except in the mode prescribed by
statute. It must, by its terms, prohibit general or free banking in
any other mode, for the reason that free banks are not, and cannot
be established by the legislature. That body can only prescribe
the terms, conditions, and mode upon and in which individuals may
establish them. The legislature can only establish, in the strict
sense of the term, a bank, by granting a special charter. It does
not thus est.ablish free banks. Individuals establish them.
Accordingly we find that the legislature has enacted a general
law, entitled "an Act to authorize and regulate the business of
general banking," which provides that "any number of persons,
not less than eleven," may, under prescribed regulations, establish
a bank, &c.
It seems to us, upon a view of the whole matter clear, beyond
doubt, that no bank of issue can be established in this State under
our present constitution, except a State bank, and free or private
banks pursuant to the provisions of the general banking law.
This being the case, it follows that the Citizens' bank of Gosport
is an illegal irsttution ; and further, that because of its illegality,
its issues are void. See Curtis et a!. vs. Leavitt, 15 New York
Court of Appeals, by Smith, p. 1. And being void, the law is well
settled that they cannot be made the foundation of an action.Any consideration given for them may be recovered back, but a suit
on the bills is not maintainable.
We have no statute, it may be remarked, as we ought to have,
making it a penal offence to issue such paper; hence its issuers
cannot be punished; but being inhibited by the constitution, and
impliedly by statute, though not under a penalty, they are illegal
and void.
The demurrer is sustained.
12

GAMBLE vs. MASON.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Maryland -District, November Term, 1858.
GAMBLE & GAMBLE vs. MASON.'

1. The 20th section of the tariff act of 1812 is still in force, and is embodied in
the act. of 1857.
2. That whether an article imported into the country, mid which is not specifically
enumerated in the schedule of the act, bears a similitude in material, quality,
texture or use, to one which is enumerated, is a question which a jury must
determine.
3. In order to maintain an action against the Collector of the Port, the plaintiff
must satisfy the jury that he has fully complied with all the requirements of the
statute, both as to form and substance.

J. Mason Campbell .Esq. and Bernard Caxter Esq., attorneys
for plaintiffs.
T. JJleade Addison, U. S. District Attorney, for defendant.
This was an action on the case brought by the plaintiffi to recover
of the defendant $187. The plaintifis are aliens and citizens of
England, and the defendant is Collector of the Customs of the
United States, at the Port of Baltimore. On the 16th of April,
1858, D. McIlvain, as consignee and agent of the plaintiffs, entered
at the custom house in Baltimore one hundred barrels of caustic
soda, valued at $1,700. The defendant assessed and levied on the
said caustic soda a duty at the rate of fifteen per cent. ad valorem ;
the consignee contending that caustic soda was liable, under the
Tariff Act of 1857, to but four per cent. ad valorem, paid the above
assessment of fifteen per cent. under protest in writing, and took
the goods; the assessment, as paid, amounted to $255. Afterwards, on the 24th of April, 1858, MeIlvain addressed a letter to
the defendant, setting forth the grounds on which he protested
against the said assessment of fifteen per cent., and the reasons
why he considered that caustic soda was liable to a duty of but
four per cent. ; the defendant, still adhering to his decision, McI1vain, as agent and consignee of the plaintiffs, on the 13th of May,
1858, appealed from his decision to the Secretary of the Treasury,
and the Secretary of the Treasury on the 18th of May, 1858,
' This is the first case that has been decided under the act of March 3, 1857.Eds. Am. Law Reg.
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notified McIlvain that he had affirmed the decision of the defendant. The plaintiffs thereupon, on the 16th day of June, 1858,
instituted the present suit.
The Act of Congress, approved March 3d, 1857, being the latest
tariff act, embraces eight separate schedules, designated by the
letters of the alphabet from A to H inclusive ; each of said schedules contains a list of enumerated articles, all articles in the same
schedule being assessed at the same rate, and a different rate being
assessed in each of the different schedules.
Schedule I contains all articles that are free of duty. The Act
of 1857 also, provides that all articles imported from abroad into
the United States, and not enumerated in said schedules, shall pay
a duty of fifteen per centum.
The Act of 1857 is similar in its provisions to the Tariff Act of
1846, which was the tariff act next preceding the Act of 1857,
with the exception that the rates of duty are different in the two
acts, and some changes made in the latter as to the relative position of some articles in different schedules.
The 20th Section of the Tariff Act of 1842, is in these words,"That there shall be levied, collected and paid on each and every
non-enumerated article which bears a similitude, either in material,
quality, texture, or the uses to which it may be applied, to any
enumerated article -chargeable with duty, the same rate of duty
which is levied and charged on the enumerated article which it
most resembles in any of the particulars before mentioned; and if
any non-enumerated article equally resembles two or more enumerated articles, on which different rates of duty are chargeable, there
shall be levied, collected and paid on such non-enumerated article
the same rate of duty as is chargeable on the article which it
resembles, paying the highest duty; and on all articles manufactured from two or more materials, the duty shall be assessed at the
highest rates at which any of its component parts may be chargeable."
The plaintiffs admitted that caustic soda was not enumerated in
any of the before mentioned schedules of the Act of 1857, but
they contended that under the 20th Section of Act of 1842, caustic
soda bears a similitude to soda ash either in material, quality, tex-
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ture, or the uses to which it may be applied, and of all the articles
enumerated in the different schedules of the Act of 1857, it most
resembles soda ash; and inasmuch as soda ash is made liable to pay
but four per cent. by said act, (being embraced in Schedule II) that
therefore caustic soda is properly chargeable wiit but four per
cent., and having paid fifteen per cent. under protest on that
entered on the 16th of April, 1858, that they are entitled in this
action to recover the difference between fifteen per cent. on $1,700,
and four per cent., on the same sum.
The defendant contended, 1st, that caustic soda is liable to pay
a duty of fifteen per cent. as an unenumerated article under the
Act of 1857.
2d. That it bears no similitude either in material, quality, texture, or the uses to which it may be applied to soda ash, and that
it does not most resemble soda ash of all the articles enumerated
in the several schedules of the Act of 1857 ; that therefore it is
not properly chargeable with the same duty as is levied upon soda
ash.
It was held by the court, GILES, J. presiding, 1st, that the 20th
Section of the Tariff Act of 1842 was still in force, and must be
considered as embodied in the Tariff Act of 1857.
2d. That if caustic soda bears a similitude to soda ash, either in
material, quality, texture, or the uses to which it may be applied,
and most resembles soda ash of all the articles enumerated in said
Tariff Act of 1857, that then caustic soda was under said act
chargeable with but four per cent. ad valorem, and that whether or
not caustic soda bears the said similitude to soda ash, and most
resembles it as aforesaid, is a question for the jury to determine.
3d. That if caustic soda more nearly resembled carbonate of
soda than it does soda ash, in the particulars mentioned in the said
20th Section of Act of 1842, which is a question for the jury to
determine, then that caustic soda was liable to a duty of eight per
cent., that being the rate of duty with which carbonate of soda is
chargeable, under the Act of 1857.
4th. That in order to miintain this action against the defendant,
the plaintiffs must show, to the satisfaction of the jury, in addition
to the other matter which they are required to show, that within

